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Toward the Preservation of Personal
Privacy: Chief Justice Wright's
Opinions on Search and Seizure
and the Right of Privacy
By KENNETH L. JFsMORE*
Introduction
When Chief Justice Donald R. Wright joined the California Supreme
Court in 1970, it had already adopted the revolutionary legal concept of
privacy defined by the United States Supreme Court in Katz v. United
States.I The highest state court had twice held that personal privacy, even
while the individual was in an area accessible to the public, may be entitled
to constitutional protection from warrantless 2 searches by the police and that
* B.A., 1963, Michigan State University; J.D., 1966, Wayne State University; member,
California and Michigan bars. Senior Attorney, Supreme Court of California.
1. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the United States Supreme Court chose to focus on the
personal privacy surrounding all persons in both private and public places, rather than on an
individual's precise position in relation to a measurable, "constitutionally protected area." Id.
at 350-52. The Court thus held that the Fourth Amendment protects "people, not places." Id. at
351. Accord, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). What a person "knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection ....
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected." 389 U.S. at 351-52. These rights of privacy have recently been held
to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). For
further discussion of the constitutional right of privacy, see generally S. HUFSTEDLER, THE
DIRECTIONS AND MISDIRECTIONS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT oF PRIVAcY (1971); Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 356-58, 382-88 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Perspectives]; Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REv.
47 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Generalities]; Note, People v. Tiggs: A New Concept of Personal
Privacy in Search and Seizure Law, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 575, 578-87 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Personal Privacy].
2. Although this commentary will not review the principles underlying the modern
constructio of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section
13, of the California Constitution, a few observations are in order. The Fourth Amendment
protects individuals "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches .... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment also provides that "no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." Because the requirements for a warrantless
search "surely cannot be less stringent," Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,479 (1963),
probable cause is also required in such circumstances. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
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evidence obtained by infringement of this right may be subject to exclusion3
at trial. 4 Following Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz,5 the California
Supreme Court had ruled in the first of these cases, People v. Edwards,6 that
the constitutionality of police searches and seizures depended upon
"whether the person [whose privacy might have been invaded has]
exhibited71 a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable governmental intrusion."
8
307 (1959). Warrantless intrusions are justified only when the suspect voluntarily consents or
immediate action is necessary to preserve life or to prevent destruction of evidence. Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951); Guidi v. Superior
Court, 10 Cal. 3d 1, 513 P.2d 908, 109 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1973). See Perspectives, supra note 1, at
358-60. No intrusion reviewed by Chief Justice Wright and discussed in this Commentary was
made with a warrant.
3. A major development common to the imposition of constitutional limitations on all
aspects of police investigatory techniques is the so-called "exclusionary rule," which provides
for the exclusion from a criminal prosecution of evidence obtained in violation of the Constitu-
tion. The rule was formally adopted in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The ultimate purpose
of the rule is to protect the individual from unreasonable governmental intrusion. Despite
widespread concern that the United States Supreme Court is slowly dismantling the exclusion-
ary rule, the California Supreme Court continues to reaffirm its adherance to that rule. See,
e.g., People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973).
For a review of the exclusionary rule, see Perspectives, supra note 1, at 409. Professor
Amsterdam concluded that the exclusionary rule functions as a general command to govern-
ment to regulate its behavior when necessary to protect an individual's overriding constitutional
rights. Id. at 361-73.
4. People v. Bradley, 1 Cal. 3d 80, 84-86, 460 P.2d 129, 131-32, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457,459-60
(1969); People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 1100-05, 458 P.2d 713, 715-18, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633,
635-38 (1969).
5. 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The Katz majority did not use the
phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy"; it referred instead to a justifiable reliance on
privacy. 389 U.S. at 353. In proposing guidelines for determining whether a person's privacy is
entitled to constitutional protection, however, Justice Harlan stated: "[A] person [must] have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy [and] that . . . expectation [must] be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
The Court subsequently derived the following standard from Justice Harlan's concurrence:
"wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy,'. . he is entitled to
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)
(citation omitted).
6. 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
7. In Edwards, and subsequently in People v. Bradley, 1 Cal. 3d 80,460 P.2d 129,81 Cal.
Rptr. 457 (1969), Justice Burke substituted the word "exhibited" for "harbored" in the
majority opinion. This substitution led Justice Tobriner to observe in his separate opinion in
Bradley that Justice Burke had thus narrowed the scope of protection because the word
"harbored" had encompassed both the subjective and the overt expectations of the individual.
Id. at 91 n.1, 460 P.2d at 133 n.1, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 461 n.1 (Tobriner, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Tobriner believes, nevertheless, that Edwards displays Justice Burke's
"sensitivity to the rights of the individual as against the powerful institution of government."
Tobriner, Justice Louis H. Burke-A Tribute, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 3, 7 (1975). Although
neither word fully describes the individual's right to Fourth Amendment protection, see Per-
spectives, supra note 1, at 384-85, guidelines are necessary as an aid to the police and the courts
in evaluating the nature of an individual's activities and expectations.
8. 71 Cal. 2d at 1100, 458 P.2d at 715, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 635. Justice Burke first referred to
Katz in People v. Terry, 70 Cal. 2d 410,427,454 P.2d 36,47-48,77 Cal. Rptr. 460,471-72 (1969),
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Lower state courts subsequently refused to suppress evidence on grounds of
an unreasonable search where the expectation of privacy was not itself
reasonable to the average person, even if the evidence were obtained by an
inordinate exercise of police power.9 Broad, objective standards that can
accommodate the myriad situations encountered by the police are, of
course, preferable to hindsight examinations of the reasonableness of police
actions; thus, it is not surprising that the California courts quickly annexed
the Edwards test in order to implement Katz.10 That standard permitted the
courts to avoid an ex post facto examination of the reasonableness of police
conduct, except where the defendant had exhibited a reasonable expectation
of privacy while in public view.
People v. TriggsII is a fine measure of Chief Justice Wright's concern
for individual privacy as well as his appreciation of the difficulties faced by
police and courts in preserving that right in an ordered society. In this
regard, he recognized that the Edwards standard was only a starting point
for a more complex analysis of the legality of a particular warrantless
intrusion and that the right to personal privacy was enjoyed by all citizens,
the innocent as well as the guilty. 12 He emphasized that the particular police
but he did not propose a standard by which the courts could measure potential infringement of
the right of privacy. The Edwards test was subsequently utilized by Justice Burke to suppress
evidence obtained in a police search of a trash barrel placed on the street for collection, People
v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 365-67, 486 P.2d 1262, 1268-69, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 68-69 (1971), and to
suppress a tape recording of a jailhouse conversation between an arrestee and his wife, North
v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 308-12, 502 P.2d 1305, 1309-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 837-40
(1972). Chief Justice Wright dissented in North. See notes 25-30 and accompanying text infra.
9. See, e.g., People v. Mullins, 50 Cal. App. 3d 61, 123 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1975) (approving
an officer's late night, warrantless trespass onto secluded rural property to search for marijuana
plants); People v. Superior Court (Stroud), 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974)
(approving use of helicopters by police to search for stolen automobile parts in a back yard);
Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 885 (1973) (approving use of
helicopters by police to search for marijuana in rural fields). But cf. People v. Sneed, 32 Cal.
App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973) (reasonable expectation of privacy to be free from
observation by helicopter hovering 25 feet above the ground). See generally Comment, Police
Helicopter Surveillance and Other Aided Observations: The Shrinking Reasonable Expectation
of Privacy, 11 CAL. W.L. REV. 505 (1975).
10. See, e.g., People v. Bradley, I Cal. 3d 80, 460 P.2d 129, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1969)
(officers illegally entered open door of residence when defendant appeared to be asleep);
People v. Myles, 6 Cal. App. 3d 788, 86 Cal. Rptr. 274 (1970) (officers illegally looked through
gap at bottom of blind from outside ledge of kitchen window); Cohen v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.
App. 3d 429, 85 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1970) (officers illegally looked through window from fourth
floor fire escape). Compare Vickery v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. App. 3d 110, 88 Cal. Rptr. 834
(1970) (officer legally opened latch on rear gate to go to back door to prevent possible escape; at
the door, he legally looked through the kitchen window) with Vidaurri v. Superior Court, 13
Cal. App. 3d 550, 91 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1970) (a person who surrounds his backyard with a fence
exhibits a reasonable expectation of privacy whether the gate is locked or not).
11. 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973). See notes 32-44 and accompany-
ing text infra.
12. The Chief Justice made the following observation in this regard: "In seeking to honor
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method used to invade that right was a measure of the reasonableness of the
individual's expectation of privacy. If the court found that the method of
invasion constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
its legality would depend on a further finding that the method was itself
reasonable in light of an average person's expectations as to the potential for
visual observation of his behavior. The purpose of this commentary is to
examine the significant opinions authored by Chief Justice Wright on search
and seizure and the right of privacy, in light of the Triggs decision. Through
a chronological case study, the Chief Justice's view on the inadequacies of
the Edwards standard will emerge. The conclusion will suggest the possible
future development of the Triggs concept of personal privacy in California.
I. The Development of a New Concept of Privacy
A. Early Opinions
In a 1972 opinion for an unanimous court, Chief Justice Wright ordered
the suppression of some seized marijuana and an incriminating tape record-
ing between a jailed man and his wife.1 3 The affidavit offered in support of
the search warrant, which authorized seizure of the marijuana, had failed to
fully inform the magistrate of the underlying circumstances on which the
informant had based his conclusions regarding the location of the coun-
traband. 14 The electronic surveillance of the telephone call had been con-
ducted without prior judicial approval, and thus violated Title 1115 of the
reasonable expectations of privacy through our application of search and seizure law, we must
consider the expectations of the innocent as well as the guilty. When innocent persons are
subjected to illegal searches-including when, as here, they do not even know their private
parts and bodily functions are being exposed to the gaze of the law-their rights are violated
even though such searches turn up no evidence of guilt. Save through the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule there is little courts can do to protect the constitutional right of persons
innocent of any crime to be free of unreasonable searches." 8 Cal. 3d at 893,506 P.2d at 237-38,
106 Cal. Rptr. at 413-14.
13. Halpin v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 885,495 P.2d 1295, 101 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1972). In his
first search and seizure opinion for the California Supreme Court, Mann v. Superior Court, 3
Cal. 3d 1, 472 P.2d 468, 88 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1970), Chief Justice Wright had "assumed without
deciding" that police officers who lacked probable cause to search had consequently violated a
"constitutional right to privacy" when they entered private property at night and hid behind
bushes in front of partially shaded windows, "from which vantage point they could see what
was going on inside the house." Id. at 7,472 P.2d at 471, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 383. The Edwards test
fit the facts: the householders' expectation of privacy was reasonable, only the police intrusion
was not. In Mann, Chief Justice Wright and Justice Peters also began a series of debates on the
proper limits of the exclusionary standard. The debate continued in Lockridge v. Superior
Court, 3 Cal. 3d 166, 474 P.2d 683, 89 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1970), and in Krauss v. Superior Court, 5
Cal. 3d 418, 487 P.2d 1023, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1023 (1970). For purposes of this commentary, it is
necessary only to note that Chief Justice Wright recognized reasonable expectations of privacy
in these cases. For a review of the controversy, see The Supreme Court of California, 1970-
1971, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 757, 870-81 (1972).
14. 6 Cal. 3d at 892-96, 495 P.2d at 1299-1302, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 379-82.
15. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,16 which had preempt-
ed California law on this point. 17 The court failed to resolve whether the jail
authorities had, however, invaded the couple's right of privacy by monitor-
ing and recording their call.18
Seven months later, in North v. Superior Court,19 a plurality opinion
ordered the suppression of a tape-recorded conversation between an arrestee
and his wife.20 In that case, the defendant's wife visited him at the police
station shortly after his arrest. A detective permitted the couple to use his
office in private. Relying heavily on Edwards and Katz,21 the court con-
cluded that although an inmate ordinarily had no right to an expectation of
privacy, the police might create that right by "[lulling the inmate] into
believing that [his] conversation would be confidential.'"2 Coupled with the
statutory presumption that a conversation between spouses is made in
confidence, 23 those circumstances established the defendant's right of priva-
cy,2 4 which had been violated in this case by monitoring and tape recording
the conversation.
In dissent on this issue, Chief Justice Wright noted that the legislature
had not included spousal conversation among the privileged prisoner com-
munications. 25 "There is likewise no sufficient constitutional ground upon
which we could or should depart from the well-established rule that a
prisoner in custody has no reasonable expectation of privacy." 26 He agreed
with the rule advocated in Justice Sullivan's separate dissent that the "place
of the communication, not the relationship of the communicating parties"
16. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
17. 6 Cal. 3d at 896-900, 1495 P.2d at 1302-06, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 382-86. Chief Justice
Wright noted that Title III is primarily concerned with protecting the right of privacy of all
citizens. Id. at 898 & n.15, 495 P.2d at 1304 & n.15, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 384 & n.15 (citing S. REP.
No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, 88-89 (1968), reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2112). See also Comment, Electronic Surveillance in California: A Study In State
Legislative Control, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1182 (1969).
18. 6 Cal. 3d at 900 & n.21, 495 P.22 at 1305 & n.21, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 385 & n.21.
19. 8 Cal. 3d 301, 502 P.2d 1305, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1972).
20. Chief Justice Wright, joined by Justice McComb, dissented on this issue. Id. at 312-
13, 502 P.2d at 1312, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 840 (Wright, C.J., concurring and dissenting). Justice
Tobriner agreed with the plurality, and was joined by Justice Peters. Id. at 314, 502 P.2d at
1312-13, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 840-41 (Tobriner, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Sullivan
separately dissented on the issue. Id. at 317-19, 502 P.2d at 1313-16, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 841-44
(Sullivan, J., dissenting). See generally The Supreme Court of California, 1971-1972, 61 CALIF.
L. REv. 287, 457-67 (1973).
21. 8 Cal. 3d at 308-11, 502 P.2d at 1309-11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 837-39.
22. Id. at 311, 502 P.2d at 1311, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
23. CAL. EVID. CODE § 917 (West 1966).
24. 8 Cal. 3d at 312, 502 P.2d at 1311, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
25. Id. at 313, 502 P.2d at 1312, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 840 (Wright, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
26. Id.
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was the factor relevant to the inquiry. 27 As Justice Sullivan noted: "Meas-
ured against an objective standard, I conclude that no reasonable person in
defendant's position could have had [an expectation of privacy]."28 Under
these circumstances "only a fatuous or naive defendant would close his eyes
to the realities and assume that he was no longer in custody. . . and that his
jail, like his home, had in some unaccountable way become his castle."
29
The dissenters in North therefore relied on the pre-Katz concept of "pro-
tected areas" or places in which no one has the right to an expectation of
privacy unless recognized by statute.
30
None of the opinions indicated whether North, who was arrested with
probable cause for serious crimes, had been arraigned prior to his wife's
visit. It is conceivable that a pre-arraigned arrestee has an expectation of
privacy warranting careful examination of the police methods used to lure
him to confide in another, especially when the police hope such methods
will bolster the case against the arrestee. 31 Chief Justice Wright soon
devised a new interpretation of "reasonable expectation of privacy" that
could be used to support this mode of analysis.
B. People v. Triggs
In People v. Triggs,32 plainclothed officers saw the defendant enter a
public restroom followed by another man ten minutes later. From a plumb-
ing access area between the men's and women's restrooms, one officer
looked through a vent above the doorless restroom stalls33 and saw the
27. Id. at 317, 502 P.2d at 1315, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 843 (Sullivan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted).
28. Id. at 318, 502 P.2d at 1316, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
29. Id. at 319, 502 P.2d at 1316, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
30. Justice Sullivan's dissent contains citations to many cases that predate Katz, all of
which held "that persons in custody ordinarily have no reasonable expecation of privacy." Id.
at 317, 502 P.2d at 1315, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 843 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). The plurality noted that
all people in custody must sacrifice some privacy so that the authorities may maintain security
and prevent escapes, 8 Cal. 3d at 309, 502 P.2d at 1309, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 837 (citing People v.
Morgan, 197 Cal. App. 2d 90, 93, 16 Cal. Rptr. 838, 840 (1961)), but recognized that the marital
communication privilege is a competing consideration. See id., 502 P.2d at 1309, 104 Cal. Rptr.
at 837.
31. The likelihood that a particular arrestee might attempt escape is, for example, coun-
tered by the fact that the primary police motivation may have been to elicit additional in-
criminating evidence before taking the arrestee before the magistrate. This balancing of com-
peting interests is basic to the implementation of the Fourth Amendment: a substantial reason
to favor the governmental interest must accompany every search. See, e.g., Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,535-37 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); People
v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 937 n.8, 538 P.2d 237, 243 n.8, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109, 115 n.8 (1975);
Jesmore, The Courthouse Search, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 797, 825 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
The Courthouse Search]. See note 55 and accompanying text infra.
32. 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973).
33. The officer testified that he had entered the plumbing access area about 50 times for
the purpose of watching the restrooms. Id. at 888-89, 506 P.2d at 235, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
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defendant engaging in statutorily proscribed sexual conduct' with the other
man. The officer later admitted that he had spied on the men without
probable cause to believe they were engaging in illegal acts. Chief Justice
Wright, speaking for an unanimous court, held that the officer's clandestine
observation violated the defendant's right to privacy because it was a search
within the purview of the Fourth Amendment. The lack of probable cause
rendered the officer's testimony concerning his observations constitutionally
inadmissible.
35
In reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice Wright rejected several Court
of Appeal cases that had held that the legality of police spying on a restroom
depended on whether the toilet stalls had doors3 and he made a conceptual
breakthrough in the area of personal privacy. 37 Under the rationale of those
cases, the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy was based solely on
the ability of the public to observe the conduct in question. If the defend-
ant's activity was open to public view because the toilet stall lacked a door,
judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of the officer's clandestine observa-
tions was foreclosed because the defendant could not reasonably have
expected his conduct to be private. 38 Chief Justice Wright's determination
that even persons in places open to public view may be entitled to privacy39
34. See Law of April 27, 1955, ch. 274, § 1, 1955 Cal. Stats. 729 (current version at CAL.
PENAL CODE § 288a (West Supp. 1977)) (forbade oral copulation between consenting adults).
The law was amended in 1975 to remove this proscription. See Law of Sept. 18, 1975, ch. 877,
§ 2, 1975 Cal. Stats. 1958. Adults who orally copulate in public may thereby violate other laws,
however. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(a), (d) (West Supp. 1977).
35. 8 Cal. 3d at 895, 506 P.2d at 239, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 415. Speaking for the court, Chief
Justice Wright also found that the officer violated section 653n of the California Penal Code,
which prohibits the use of two-way mirrors permitting observation of any restroom, toilet, or
bathroom. Id. at 893-94, 506 P.2d at 238, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 414. See Personal Privacy, supra note
1, at 576-77.
36. See, e.g., People v. Crafts, 13 Cal. App. 3d 457, 91 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1970); People v.
Heath, 266 Cal. App. 2d 754, 72 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968); People v. Roberts, 256 Cal. App. 2d488,
64 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1967); People v. Maldonado, 240 Cal: App. 2d 812, 50 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1966);
People v. Hensel, 233 Cal. App. 2d 834, 43 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1965); People v. Young, 214 Cal.
App. 2d 131, 29 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1963); People v. Norton, 209 Cal. App. 2d 173, 25 Cal. Rptr. 676
(1962).
The California Supreme Court .had last considered the legality of clandestine restroom
observations in 1962. Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 489
(1962); Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 522 (1962). In both
cases, the court considered expectations of privacy but also concentrated on the "manner in
which the police observed a place . . . which is ordinarily understood to afford personal
privacy to individual occupants." Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 472, 374 P.2d 817,
819, 24 Cal, Rptr. 849, 851 (1962). See Personal Privacy, supra note I, at 587-93. The emphasis
in Britt on the "means of observation" was disregarded in the subsequent cases. 8 Cal. 3d at
890, 506 P.2d at 236, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
37. For a thorough analysis of the significance of Triggs, see Personal Privacy, supra note
I.
38. 8 Cal. 3d at 890, 506 P.2d at 236, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
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thus shifted the focus of judicial inquiry to the method by which the police
make their observations. 4' Where the method employed is clandestine in
nature, as it was in Triggs, the legality of the search will depend upon
whether the officer making the observation had probable cause.
41
The scope and meaning of Triggs is still uncertain.4 2 Although the
court has subsequently implied that it will consider principles akin to those
developed in Triggs,43 progress toward a definitive standard has been slow.
39. "The expectation of privacy a person has when he enters a rest room is reasonable and
is not diminished or destroyed because the toilet stall being used lacks a door." Id. at 891, 506
P.2d at 236, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
40. See id. at 890, 506 P.2d at 236, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 412. See note 36 supra.
41. Id. at 894, 506 P.2d at 238-39, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 414-15. "Unless he has probable cause
to search, an officer has no right to retreat to a clandestine position" to watch private activity.
Id. at 894 n.7, 506 P.2d at 238 n.7, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 414 n.7. Chief Justice Wright assumed
without deciding, however, that a warrant was not required for the search if the police had
probable cause. Id. at 894, 506 P.2d at 238, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 414. The court subsequently held
that probable cause to arrest did not justify warrantless spying except in certain situations.
Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 639-40, 511 P.2d 33,42-43,108 Cal. Rptr. 585,594-
95 (1973). See note 43 infra.
42. See Personal Privacy, supra note 1, at 597-601. The court did not provide reasons for
the conclusion that a person has a right of privacy even in a doorless stall. This omission might
have been deliberate in order to leave the lower courts free to define the degree of privacy that
could be expected in different places.
43. See, e.g., Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 511 P.2d 33, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585
(1973). Justice Tobriner, joined by Chief Justice Wright and Justices Mosk and Sullivan,
concluded that an officer violated a householder's reasonable expectation of privacy by
walking across a short strip of land to peer through a two inch gap between the bottom of a
window shade and the window sill. Before citing Triggs and Edwards, the court made a few
observations that fit the Triggs approach. Even if the strip could be considered a "normal
[public] access route" to the home, that route would not lead "to a point within a scant six
inches from the window." Id. at 636, 511 P.2d at 40-41, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 592-93. More
importantly, "[tihe fact that apertures existed in the window, so that an unlawfully intruding
individual so motivated could spy into the residence, [did] not dispel the reasonableness of the
occupants' expecation of privacy." Id. at 636, 511 P.2d at 41, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 593. After
reviewing Katz and Justice Harlan's concurrence therein, the court looked "to the conduct of
people in regard to" the area. Id. at 638, 511 P.2d at 44, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 592. An occupant
cannot claim "he expected privacy from all observations of the officer who stands upon"
ground that has been opened to public use. Id. Implicit in this language may be the belief,
initially expressed in Triggs, that some observations of an officer made from an area open to
the public may be unreasonable in that their clandestine nature violates a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. Id. at 639, 511 P.2d at 42, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
Within a few months after Lorenzana, the court established a three-tiered hierarchy of
"places" entitled to different expectations of privacy. People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 882 &
nn. 8-10, 512 P.2d 1208, 1216 & nn. 8-10, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304, 312 & nn. 8-10 (1973) (opinion by
Justice Mosk). This division created "a single standard of reasonableness to [be applied to] all
places in accordance with a fundamental understanding that a particular intrusion" into one
place might seriously threaten personal security, while the same intrusion into another domain
might not. Id. at 883, 512 P.2d at 1216, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 312. Chief Justice Wright and Justice
Tobriner joined in Justice Sullivan's concurrence, disagreeing with "the majority's gratuitous
attempt to establish a hierarchy of Fourth Amendment protection dependent upon fictional
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The Edwards standard has, however, lost some of its vitality. Since Triggs,
the California Supreme Court has rarely relied upon Edwards in determin-
ing an individual's right of privacy.
44
II. "Reasonable" Intrusions on Privacy
A. Airport Searches
By 1974, the California Supreme Court had received many petitions in
which the parties argued that airport security investigations were violative of
the Fourth Amendment because they constituted warrantless, personal
searches that were conducted without probable cause. In People v. Hyde,45
an unanimous court found that properly circumscribed screening procedures
were constitutional, but split 4-3 on the correct rationale. Relying on
precedent established by administrative inspection cases, 46 the Hyde majori-
ty concluded that such searches were permissible because they were part of a
necessary regulatory scheme that insured that dangerous weapons were not
carried aboard an airplane, rather than part of a criminal investigation to
obtain evidence of a specific offense. 47 On balance, the government's need
to inspect carry-on baggage and the individual's person outweighed the
passenger's right to be free from this inoffensive intrusion.
48
Chief Justice Wright's concurrence in Hyde illustrated both his disag-
reement with the rationale adopted by the majority49 and his belief that the
minimal amount of governmental intrusion necessary to alleviate the evil
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 50 Because the individual is
levels or degrees of privacy which persons supposedly assign to houses, cars, trucks and trash
cans." Id. at 886, 512 P.2d at 1219, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 315 (Sullivan, J., concurring). The
classification "tends to dilute, if not annul, our responsibility to determine whether, under the
circumstances of each case, a warrantless search is unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth
Amendment." Id. The Dumas opinion should not be read to weaken Triggs, which itself
concerned an area more public in nature than a home or an automobile.
44. See, e.g., Guidi v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 1, 6, 513 P.2d 908, 911, 109 Cal. Rptr.
684, 687 (1973); Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 638-39, 511 P.2d 33, 42, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 585, 594 (1973).
45. 12 Cal. 3d 158, 524 P.2d 830, 115 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1974). See The Courthouse Search,
supra note 31, at 809-15.
46. Id. at 165-68, 524 P.2d at 834-36, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 362-64. See, e.g., United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
47. 12 Cal. 3d at 165-66, 524 P.2d at 834, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
48. Id. at 166-67, 524 P.2d at 835, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
49. Chief Justice Wright suggested that by relying on the administrative inspection cases,
the majority failed to give proper weight to the distinguishing features of the airport screening
procedures. Id. at 170, 524 P.2d at 837, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 365 (Wright, C.J., concurring). He
reasoned that the government's needs at the airport justified a reduced level of Fourth Amend-
ment protection. Id. at 174, 524 P.2d at 840-41, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 368-69.
50. Id. at 177, 524 P.2dat 843,115 Cal. Rptr. at371. Cf. People v. Farlow, 52 Cal. App. 3d
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entitled to privacy even in a quasi-public facility, 51 airport screening proce-
dures must safeguard prospective passengers from unnecessary invasion of
their privacy in order to pass constitutional muster. Chief Justice Wright
pointed to three considerations that tended to ameliorate the intrusion inci-
dent to an airport screening investigation. First and foremost, the prospec-
tive passenger was given advance notice of the screening. "[A]s a factor of
major significance in evaluating the extent to which individual privacy is
compromised and intruded upon by government [action, advance] notice
enables the individual to avoid the embarassment and psychological disloca-
tion that a surprise search causes.''52 Second, the prospective passenger
could elect not to proceed with the screening and this, in turn, lessened the
psychological impact attendant to conventional searches in which there was
no choice but to submit to the invasion. 53 Third, most prospective passen-
gers welcomed nondiscriminatory, limited searches as a safety precaution.
54
The airport security check that did invade individual privacy was thus minor
when balanced against the government's compelling need to prevent hijack-
ings and its inability to search only those individuals who posed a real threat
to security.
55
Chief Justice Wright's respect for the individual's right of privacy thus
remained unaltered by his concurrence in Hyde. 56 His opinion in that case
414, 125 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1975) (airport search of a jacket carried over defendant's arm in which
cocaine was found in a cigarette box was reasonable).
51. See 12 Cal. 3d at 175,524 P.2d at 841, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 369 (Wright, C.J., concurring).
52. Id. at 175-76, 524 P.2d at 842, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
53. Id. at 176, 524 P.2d at 842, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 370. Chief Justice Wright noted that the
United States Supreme Court has recognized that this psychological impact is a factor bearing
upon the reasonableness of an intrusion. Id. at 176 n. 14, 524 P.2d at 842 n. 14, 115 Cal. Rptr. at
370 n.14. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 537 (1967).
54. 12 Cal. 3d at 177, 524 P.2d at 843, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 371 (Wright, C.J., concurring).
55. Id. Chief Justice Wright was careful to note that this balancing approach did not
diminish the overall protection of the Fourth Amendment: "The standards applicable to
conventional searches and seizures remain unaltered." Id. For a discussion of the balancing
approach, see Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A
Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1011
(1973).
Both majority and concurring opinions have been criticized for adopting a balancing test to
gauge the reasonableness of a security search. See The Supreme Court of California, 1973-1974,
63 CALIF. L. REv. 9, 176-79 (1975). Whether any serious threat to public safety, such as
the armed robbery of a bank, justifies such an unprecedented modification of traditional Fourth
Amendment standards raises difficult constitutional questions. The commentators have thus
suggested that a more rational approach to the problem before the Hyde court would have been
to create a new, but well-delineated, exception to the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 180.
56. People v. Bracamonte, 15 Cal. 3d 394, 540 P.2d 624, 124 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1975), for
example, exemplifies Chief Justice Wright's belief that privacy of person must be protected
from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 404-05, 540 P.2d at 631, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 535
(citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)). In that case, defendant swallowed
balloons in response to a police confrontation in which a search warrant authorized the search
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shows more than mere disagreement with the majority's analogy to adminis-
trative search cases. Chief Justice Wright's basic concern may well have
been that the court should avoid the use of regulatory inspection decisions to
justify incursions into individual privacy that are partially intended to reveal
evidence of criminal conduct.
57
B. Street Confrontations
Chance encounters between the police and persons suspected of crimin-
al activity have frequently provided the court with an opportunity to define
the parameters of the Fourth Amendment. Chief Justice Wright did not
apply. the innovative Triggs rationale in his last two opinions on street
confrontations 58 because in neither case was the method of observation
employed by the police at issue. In both situations, the police observed
violations of the traffic laws on public thoroughfares. The legality of the
police conduct after the defendants were brought into legal custody was the
issue before the court.
In People v. Norman,59 a motorist who was driving at night without
headlights drove off when an officer attempted to detain him. He was finally
forced to a stop and stepped out of his truck holding a black, cylindrical
of her person. An officer with probable cause to believe defendant had swallowed containers of
drugs asked hospital personnel to pump her stomach. The defendant pleaded that the procedure
of forcing a tube through a nostril and into her esophagus was too painful, agreed to drink an
emetic, and soon regurgitated several balloons containing heroin. The entire court joined Chief
Justice Wright in concluding that the intrusion violated the Fourth Amendment for lack of
reasonableness. Id. at 399-400, 540 P.2d at 627-28, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 531-32. The court reasoned
that the search warrant did not authorize an intrusion beyond the surface of the body, that no
emergency existed (the court found no evidence that it was necessary to pump the defendant's
stomach to save herJife, id. at 401-02 & n.5, 540 P.2d at 629 & n.5, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 533 & n.5),
and that the search was not incident to the arrest. "[M]ore than probable cause [is necessary] to
believe that contraband will be found. . . . There must also be the need to prevent the arrested
person from. . . destroying evidence." Id. at 403, 540 P.2d at 630, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 534. No
such need existed because the balloons would have passed through defendant's digestive tract
by natural processes. Thus, the intrusion was more than minor; it was of intolerable intensity
and scope. Id. at 404-05, 540 P.2d at 631, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 535. As in his concurrence in Hyde,
the' Chief Justice demanded that the police use the least offensive intrusion possible to discover
evidence of crime; any greater intrusion was presumptively unreasonable. See notes 49-55 and
accompanying text supra.
57. It is easy to hold that the degree of governmental intrusion upon personal privacy must
be reasonably proportionate to the government's need, or that both personal expectations of
privacy and police intrusions must be reasonable. These formulas offer little guidance to police,
however, "in rapidly unfolding . . . situations" that require an "escalating set of flexible
responses, graduated in relation to the amount of information [possessed by the police]." Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968). A sliding-scale approach derived from prior confrontations
might, however, further complicate implementation of the Fourth Amendment. See Perspec-
tives, supra note 1, at 390-94.
58. Wimberly v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 557, 547 P.2d 417, 128 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1976);
People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 538 P.2d 237, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1975).
59. 14 Cal. 3d 929, 538 P.2d 237, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1975).
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object that appeared to be a gun. Ordered to drop the object, the driver
tossed it under his truck. A fellow officer retrieved the object, which was a
soft tobacco pouch, opened it, and found narcotics inside. Chief Justice
Wright, joined by three other justices, 60 agreed with the trial court's conclu-
sion that the search was illegal. 61 Because the defendant dropped the pouch
in response to a police order, the action was not furtive and did not warrant
the belief that evidence of a crime was being concealed.62 Similarly, the
search was not necessary to prevent a person in custody from retrieving a
weapon. 63 While testifying at trial, one officer admitted that he thought it
was not a gun when the pouch hit the pavement without making any noise;
his suspicion was confirmed when he picked it up and discovered it was
soft. 64 Lacking probable cause to believe the pouch contained a weapon, the
officer's search was impermissible. On balance, defendant's expectation of
privacy outweighed the need for the search.
65
In 1973, the court had declared that although an automobile carried a
considerable expectation of privacy, this expectation was not as intense or
60. Justices Mosk, Tobriner, and Sullivan agreed. Justice Richardson concurred on the
issue relevant to this discussion. Justice McComb joined Justice Clark's dissent. Id.
61. The magistrate had denied Norman's motion to suppress evidence at the preliminary
hearing. Norman moved in the trial court to set aside the information on the ground that the
only material evidence was seized as the result of an illegal search. The court granted the
motion to set aside the information. Id. at 931, 538 P.2d at 239, 123 Cal. Rptr. at I11.
62. Id. at 933, 538 P.2d at 240, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 112. Certain furtive movements establish
probable cause for a search if an officer can reasonably infer from the timing and direction of
the suspect's movements that-he is hiding contraband. See People v. Superior Court (Kiefer), 3
Cal. 3d 807, 817, 478 P.2d 449, 454, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729, 734 (1970).
63. 14 Cal. 3d at 936, 538 P.2d at 243, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 115. The court noted that although
the officers may have had the option of taking Norman before a magistrate, they had no
probable cause to believe he possessed a weapon, instrumentalities of a crime, or contraband.
Id. at 935, 538 P.2d at 242, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 114. Absent probable cause to believe weapons are
in the car or on the arrestee's person, "the driver's expectation of privacy outweighed any need
to search for the officer's protection." Id. at 937 n.8, 538 P.2d at 243 n.8, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 115
n.8 (citing People v. Superior Court (Simon), 7 Cal. 3d 186,206,496 P.2d 1205, 1219-20, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 837, 851-52 (1972)). A driver's initial expectation of privacy remains unchanged, even if
he is later booked for a traffic offense.
64. Id. at 936-37, 538 P.2d at 243, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 115. A weapons search must be limited
to a scope necessary to accomplish its purpose. See M. KRAUSE, CALIFORNIA SEARCH AND
SEIZURE PRACTICE § 5.2, at 157 (1976). A soft package does not ordinarily contain a weapon.
People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 394, 461 P.2d 659, 668, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379, 388 (1969).
65. 14 Cal. 3d at 938, 538 P.2d at 244, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 116. The remainder of Chief Justice
Wright's opinion reaffirmed the court's previous conclusion that it could impose a higher
constitutional standard for searches and seizures on the basis of the California Constitution
than had been imposed by the United States Supreme Court on the basis of the federal
Constitution. See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 548-52, 531 P.2d 1099, 1111-15, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 327-31 (1975). The dissenters and Justice Richardson, otherwise concurring, would
have held California to the standard set by the United States Supreme Court, which essentially
permits a full body search of any arrestee. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973);
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
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insistent as that found in the home or office. 66 As a result, the court
subsequently held that a warrantless search of an automobile could be
justified on probable cause alone. 67 Several courts of appeal soon reached
contrary results on the issue of whether police officers who had probable
cause to search the interior of an automobile could expand that search
without a warrant to concealed areas such as the trunk. 68 Wimberly v.
Superior Court69 provided the California Supreme Court with an opportuni-
ty to reaffirm its adherance to the Fourth Amendment principles first voiced
in Katz.
70
In Wimberly, two officers made a proper traffic stop. Using a flash-
light, 71 one officer peered into the automobile and saw twelve distinctive
seeds on the floor next to a pipe. After the officer sniffed the pipe and
smelled burnt marijuana, he searched the interior of the car. He found a
plastic bag containing a small amount of marijuana in a jacket pocket. When
the trunk compartment was opened with the car's keys, the officers found
several pounds of marijuana. While concluding that the officers' plain view
of the seeds afforded probable cause for the seizure of the pipe and the
subsequent interior search of the car, 72 the court held that the search of the
trunk was an intrusion into a distinct part of the car in which there was a
reasonably greater expectation of privacy than in the passenger compart-
ment.73 The court noted that the reasonableness of an officer's decision to
search without a warrant depended upon the existence of specific facts that
create a reasonable belief that seizable items are in fact being concealed.
74
Had the officers found a substantial quantity in the passenger compartment,
they would have had sufficient reason to believe that a similar quantity was
66. People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 882-83, 512 P.2d 1208, 1215-16, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304,
311-12 (1973). See note 43 supra.
67. If the police had probable cause to believe that an automobile stopped on the highway
contained contraband or evidence of crime, they were allowed to search in areas where they
might reasonably expect to find such evidence, even though they had not obtained a warrant.
People v. Cook, 13 Cal. 3d 663, 669, 532 P.2d 148, 151, 119 Cal. Rptr. 500, 503 (1975).
68. See People v. Jochen, 46 Cal. App. 3d 243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1975); People v.
Superior Court (Courie), 44 Cal. App. 3d 207, 118 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1974); People v. Gregg, 43 Cal.
App. 3d 137, 117 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1974).
69. 16 Cal. 3d 557, 547 P.2d 417, 128 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1976).
70. Although the opinion did not cite to Edwards, to the Dumas passage that established
the hierarchy of Fourth Amendment protections, or to the Katz passage in which the United
States Supreme Court shifted its focus to reasonable expectation, the Katz rationale was
nevertheless evident. Id. at 567-69, 547 P.2d at 423-25, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 647-49.
71. The use of a flashlight to illuminate the interior of the vehicle was of "no constitution-
al significance." Id. at 563 n.2, 547 P.2d at 421 n.2, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 645 n.2 (relying on People
v. Hill, 12 Cal. 3d 731, 748, 528 P.2d 1, 14, 117 Cal. Rptr. 393, 406 (1974); People v. Superior
Court (Mata), 3 Cal. App. 3d 636, 84 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1970)).
72. 16 Cal. 3d at 564-65, 547 P.2d at 421-22, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 645-46.
73. Id. at 567-68, 547 P.2d at 423-24, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 647-48.
74. Id. at 568, 547 P.2d at 424, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
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being transported in the trunk.75 The occupants of the car in this case,
however, appeared to be only casual marijuana users, not dealers or trans-
porters. Their right of privacy over the contents of concealed areas of their
car outweighed the officers' right to search.
76
Conclusion
People v. Triggs,7 perhaps the most significant contribution to the
development of the law of privacy since United States v. Katz,78 imposed a
duty upon the courts to consider more than the manner in which the
individual conducted himself in public. That manner alone might not open
the door to a more intrusive, unexpected police surveillance. Triggs thus
requires reexamination of many tenets of search and seizure law. An
occupant of a house might, for example, expect that a passerby would
glance through a window or over a fence to see the interior of his home or
yard; a similar observation by a police officer would be legal.7 9 If the officer
remained outside the window or fence and peered through small openings
for extended periods of time in quest of evidence of criminal activity,
however, his covert and intense observations would not, under the Triggs
rationale, be the equivalent of a passerby's brief observations.8 0 Rather,
such activity would constitute a search in violation of the occupant's privacy
of both place and person.
Other methods of police observation that are now condoned by the
courts must also be reexamined in light of Triggs. An apartment occupant
who might expect that a passerby or neighbor would hear his loud conversa-
tion should not be subjected to prolonged police eavesdropping on his
75. Id. at 572-73, 547 P.2d at 427-28, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 651-52. The quantity of marijuana
alone was not determinative. Additional circumstances, such as an attempt to avoid apprehen-
sion or the strong odor of fresh marijuana smoke, may have generated a reasonable suspicion
sufficient to establish probable cause. Id. at 573, 547 P.2d at 428, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
76. Justice Clark, joined by Justice McComb, dissented in Wimberly. The dissenters
disagreed with the majority's conclusion that a casual user was not likely to keep more drugs in
the trunk. The dissenters did agree with the majority, however, that a greater expectation of
privacy attached to the trunk than to the passenger compartment. Id. at 576-77, 547 P.2d at 430,
128 Cal. Rptr. at 654 (Clark, J., dissenting).
77. 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973).
78. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
79. See People v. Superior Court (Irwin), 33 Cal. App. 3d 475, 109 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1973)
(peeking through cracks in a garage door from the driveway held permissible); cf. Lorenzana v.
Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 632, 511 P.2d 33, 35, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585, 587 (1973) (a sidewalk or
similar passageway implies permission to enter and necessarily negates any reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy as to observations made there). But see People v. Fly, 34 Cal. App. 3d 665, 110
Cal. Rptr. 158 (1973) (use of telescope to look into yard through fence covered by nearly
impenetrable foilage held improper). See note 43 supra.
80. Cf. People v. Berutko, 71 Cal. 2d 84, 453 P.2d 721, 77 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1969) (by
inference); People v. Superior Court (Reilly), 53 Cal. App. 3d 40, 45, 125 Cal. Rptr. 504, 508
(1975) (by inference).
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whispered conversations. 81 Aerial flights over rural property in search of
crime would be justified only if flown in a manner expected of private pilots
unconcerned with such evidence. 2 The use of binoculars by the police to
spy on people and homes for extended periods of time83 and the installation
of television cameras to monitor street activity in areas of excessive criminal
activity are similarly not equivalent to the passerby's brief observations.
84
Police observation of the darkened interior of an automobile at night could
also be unreasonable if the owner displayed a high expectation of privacy by
conducting his activities in the dark85 and the police lacked probable cause
for a search.
86
Personal privacy cannot be sheltered from unreasonable governmental
intrusion by courtroom rhetoric. Justice Wright's opinions on search and
seizure and the right of privacy emphasized that it is the duty of the judiciary
to pay the utmost respect to privacy of the person. These opinions exemplify
not only the practicality of the Chief Justice's views but also his concern for
the preservation of this precious right. The task before the California courts
will be to stabilize and clarify the concept of privacy set forth in Triggs.
People will then know the times and places at which they can expect
personal privacy free from governmental intrusion; the police will similarly
be able to combat crime while protecting the right of privacy.
81. See People v. Guerra, 21 Cal. App. 3d 534, 538, 98 Cal. Rptr. 627, 629 (1971);
Perspectives, supra note I, at 404-05.
82. The method of observation in the most public of places may be so offensive as to tip
the balance in favor of the right of individual privacy. See, e.g., People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App.
3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973). See also Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp.,
416 U.S. 861 (1974). Sneed was one of the few California cases to fully embrace the Triggs
rationale. 32 Cal. App. 3d at 541-43, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 149-51.
83. See, e.g., People v. Henze, 253 Cal. App. 2d 986, 61 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1967); cf. United
States v. Kim, 415.F. Supp. 1252 (D. Hawaii 1976) (telescope).
84. One commentator recognizes that the individual's expectation of privacy is less on a
public street or in a park than in a car or home, but suggests that "privacy has temporal and
circumstantial as well as geographic dimensions." Generalities, supra note 1, at 82-83.
85. Unable to find a private place in a crowded society, people may seek a semblance of
quiet in their cars. See Perspectives, supra note 1, at 401-09. Although such persons probably
expect that others are more likely to see their activities in their car than in their home, a Triggs
analysis could limit the methods available to the police and the places they could look to
discover evidence of crime. See Generalities, supra note 1, at 75-76. But see Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 583 (1974). A Triggs analysis must, however, recognize the problems faced by the
police while investigating criminal activity.
86. People v. Wheeler, 28 Cal. App. 3d 1065, 1069, 105 Cal. Rptr. 56, 58 (1972); People v.
Superior Court (Mata), 3 Cal. App. 3d 636, 84 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1970).
Fall 1977]

